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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A surviving form of common law, a Dead Man’s statute2 is “a law prohibiting the 
admission of a decedent’s3 statement as evidence in certain circumstances, as when 
an opposing party or witness seeks to use the statement to support a claim against the 
decedent’s estate.”4  Over the past 150 years, these statutes have “excluded the 
testimony of the parties to [a] lawsuit and of all persons having a direct pecuniary or 
                                                                
1After receiving his B.S., magna cum laude, from the University of Tennessee, the author 
received his J.D., cum laude, from the University of Richmond School of Law.  The author 
currently serves as the judicial clerk to the Honorable S. Thomas Anderson, U.S. Magistrate 
Judge for the Western District of Tennessee.  This article is dedicated to the author’s family: 
to Ed and Liz, to Mollie and Nathan, to Meg, and to Diana.  The author wishes to thank 
Professor Marci Kelly for her valuable assistance in the preparation of this article. 
2Authorities and commentators are inconsistent as to whether the proper term is “Dead 
Man statute,” “Dead Man’s statute,” or “Deadman’s statute.”  For purposes of this article, the 
author will use “Dead Man’s statute.” 
3For purposes of this paper, the author will use the word “decedent” to refer to the 
individual a Dead Man’s statute is designed to protect.  Although in various Dead Man’s 
statutes, other types of individuals, including insane persons and the like, are protected, using 
“decedent” alone will assist with the flow of the article. 
4BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 404 (7th ed. 1999). 
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proprietary interest in the outcome [of a lawsuit].”5  While they may very well be 
applicable in other circumstances, including family law matters,6 the majority of 
Dead Man’s statute case law centers around an interested witness being refused the 
right to testify in a probate proceeding. 
Dead Man’s statutes have received constant criticism since their first appearance 
almost 150 years ago;7 however, these statutes still remain valid law in many states.  
Dead Man’s statutes are confusing to lawyers, judges, scholars and the average 
citizen, as “[t]he mere mention of the [Dead Man’s] statute is enough to make most 
practitioners shudder.”8  More importantly, these statutes are unfairly prejudicial to 
those truly honest people who have valid claims but are nevertheless prevented from 
testifying in court.  Therefore, in order to move toward an evidentiary system that is 
fairer to the majority of people and to be in line with the majority of states that have 
rejected the Dead Man’s statute altogether,9 this paper will propose a modification or 
a replacement for those states that still have a Dead Man’s statute. 
                                                                
5J. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 65, at 250 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]. 
6See generally Steve Planchon, Comment, The Application of the Dead Man’s Statute in 
Family Law, 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 561 (2000). 
7For a more complete discussion of the criticisms behind Dead Man’s statutes, see infra 
Part IV. 
8Michael D. Simon & William T. Hennessey, Estates, Trusts, and Guardianships: 1998 
Survey of Florida Law, 23 NOVA. L. REV. 119, 145 (1998). 
9Thirty-two states have expressly rejected the Dead Man’s Statute.  See CAL. EVID. CODE  
§ 1261 (West 2004) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/8-101 (West 2004) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-
9-1 (2004) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-49 (2004) 
(permitting testimony from an interested witness); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-16-34 (Michie 
2004) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (Michie 
2003) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-102 
(Michie 2003) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.310 
(2001) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); IOWA CODE § 622.3 (1997) (“No 
person offered as a witness in any action or proceeding in any court . . . shall be excluded by 
reason of the person’s interests in the event of the action or proceeding, or because the person 
is a party thereto, except as provided in this chapter.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 65 (1997) 
(permitting testimony from an interested witness); MO. REV. STAT. § 491.010 (1997) 
(permitting testimony from an interested witness); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.075 (1997) 
(“Evidence is not inadmissible solely because it is evidence of transactions or conversations 
with or the actions of a deceased person.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, 2601 (1997) (noting that 
“[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in this Code); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-172 (1996) (permitting testimony from an interested witness); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS 9-17-12 (1996) (“No person shall be disqualified from testifying in any civil 
action or proceeding by reason of his or her being interested therein or being a party thereto.”); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:25 (repealed 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210 (repealed 
1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-7 (repealed 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1 (repealed 
1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1202 (repealed 1975); DEL. R. EVID. 601 (superseding the 
Delaware’s Deadman’s Statute and permitting testimony from an interested witness); MINN. 
R. EVID. 616 (superceding Deadman’s Statute and permitting testimony from an interested 
witness); MONT. R. EVID. 601 (abolishing the state’s Deadman’s Statute and permitting 
testimony from an interested witness); N.D. R. EVID. 601 (superceding North Dakota’s 
Deadman’s Statute and permitting testimony from an interested witness); TEX. R. EVID. 601 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss1/6
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In order to understand why Dead Man’s statutes should be amended by state 
legislatures, it is important to look at the historical context of Dead Man’s statutes 
and how they have been handled, interpreted and applied in different states.  
Consequently, Part II of this paper presents an historical outline of Dead Man’s 
statutes; Part III surveys nine states that currently have a common law Dead Man’s 
statute; Part IV analyzes the weaknesses behind the Dead Man’s statute; Part V 
presents three separate alternatives that states should consider adopting in lieu of 
their current Dead Man’s statutes.  Finally, part VI concludes this paper. 
II.  A HISTORY OF DEAD MAN’S STATUTES 
The modern day Dead Man’s statute is the descendant of ancient English law.  
During the fifteenth century, juries in England consisted only of those persons who 
were familiar with the context of the case; therefore, the parties and witnesses to a 
lawsuit were also interested.10  Disinterested witnesses were actually discouraged 
from participating in the proceedings.11  This practice, however, was amended over 
time, and in the seventeenth century, English law gave a defendant two choices for 
his or her trial: a trial by jury or a wager of law.12  Under a wager of law, a defendant 
was tried solely on his or her own testimony and the testimony of those who would 
testify on his or her behalf.13  Under a trial by jury, however, the defendant did not 
testify on his or her own behalf; instead, the jury decided guilt or innocence based on 
the weight of the evidence.14  “Before a jury, the parties do not swear.  They plead 
orally, or argue, or allege things ‘in evidence’ – either by themselves or by their 
counsel; but they do not take an oath.”15  The trial by jury soon became the normal 
choice for defendants, and therefore, the choice of wager of law was removed as an 
option.16  In a trial by jury, however, interested witnesses were prohibited from 
testifying.  English courts determined that juries were unable to properly weigh the 
                                                          
(abrogating the Dead Man’s Statute); UTAH R. EVID. 601 (permitting testimony of an 
interested witness); Johnson v. Porter, 471 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ohio 1984) (holding that 
Evidence Rule 601 abrogated the Deadman’s Statute); Cavanah v. Martin, 590 P.2d 41, 42 
(Alaska 1979) (“Alaska has completely eliminated the common law disqualification of 
witnesses based on interest, including when their interest involves a claim against an estate.”); 
Davis v. Hare, 561 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ark. 1978) (noting that the Arkansas Deadman’s Statute 
“was in fact expressly repealed by the [state’s adoption of the] Uniform Rules of Evidence”); 
Hew v. Aruda, 462 P.2d 476, 479 (Haw. 1969) (noting that this “archaic rule of 
disqualification” has “not [been] adopted in Hawaii”); Scott v. Farrow, 391 P.2d 47 (Kan. 
1964); Estate of Bergman v. Gunn, 761 P.2d 452, 455 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that New 
Mexico’s Deadman’s Statute was repealed in 1973).  
102 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 575, at 800-02 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) [hereinafter 
WIGMORE]. 
11Id. at 802 (“[I]t was rather the disinterested persons who were likely to be treated as 
improper witnesses.”). 
12Id. at 806. 
13Id. 
14Id. 
15Id. 
16Id. 
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testimony; therefore, “[u]ntil 1843 no person who had been convicted of a crime or 
had any pecuniary interest in a case could give evidence at its trial . . . .”17
In the nineteenth century, due to changing circumstances and criticism, English 
law officially abolished the statutory disqualifications for interest.  English legal 
scholar Jeremy Bentham “first furnished the arsenal of arguments for transforming 
the public opinion.”18  Instead of prohibiting an interested person from testifying on 
his own behalf or on someone else’s behalf, Lord Denman’s Act in 1843 adopted a 
policy that gave the jury the power of deciding guilt or innocence.  The Act states as 
follows: 
Whereas the inquiry after truth in courts of justice is often obstructed by 
incapacities created by the present law, and it is desirable that full 
information as to the facts in issue, both in criminal and in civil cases, 
should be laid before the persons who are appointed to decide upon them, 
and that such persons should exercise their judgment on the credit of the 
witnesses adduced, and on the truth of their testimony.19
Only eight years later, in 1851, England passed another Act, amending its laws of 
evidence to allow interested witnesses and parties who were “competent and 
compellable to give evidence.”20  After Lord Denman’s Act and the 1851 evidentiary 
changes, England did not enact a form of Dead Man’s statute prohibiting interested 
persons from testifying.21
In the United States, many of the states followed England’s lead in abolishing the 
disinterested witness rules.  In 1841, Michigan was the first state to abolish the 
interest disqualification,22 and the remaining states followed Michigan’s lead by 
1904.23  Although these states removed the interested witness disqualification, the 
same states began enacting Dead Man’s statutes to “protect[] estates of decedents.”24  
Judge Alpheus F. Haymond of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, who 
supported the creation of these statutes, wrote in 1878 that 
the intention of the law in the exception to the privilege to testify was 
intended to prevent an undue advantage on the part of the living over the 
dead, who cannot confront the survivor, or give his version of the affairs, 
or expose the omissions, mistakes or perhaps falsehoods of such survivor.  
The temptation to falsehood and concealment in such cases is considered 
                                                                
17Id. at 816-17. 
18Id. at 816. 
19Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 85 (Eng.); see also WIGMORE, 
supra note 10, § 488, at 647-48 n.1 (quoting Lord Denman’s Act). 
20Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., ch. 99 (Eng.). 
21Stanley E. Didisman, The West Virginia Dead Man’s Statute, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 239, 
240 (1957). 
22Act of Apr. 13, 1841, Pub. L. No. 80, § 1, 1841 Mich. Pub. Acts 176, 176-77 (codified 
as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2158 (2003)). 
23WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 488, at 647 n.1. 
24Didisman, supra note 21, at 240-41. 
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too great, to allow the surviving party to testify in his own behalf.  Any 
other view of this subject, I think would place in great peril the estates of 
the dead, and would in fact make them an easy prey for the dishonest and 
unscrupulous, which with due deference to the views and opinions of 
others, it seems to me, the Legislature never intended.25
Judge Haymond’s views were shared by many of those in favor of enacting Dead 
Man’s statutes; therefore, statutes were drafted “to prevent the fabrication of claims 
that neither the deceased nor the executor of the estate is in a position to rebut and to 
preserve estates for the benefit of heirs of the decedent whenever there is any room 
to doubt the merits of the claims being brought.”26
In the years following Judge Haymond’s remarks, Dead Man’s statutes were 
enacted across the nation to ensure equality in the courtroom.27  Many commentators 
supported these statutes, and one particular scholar noted that 
[i]t is also easy for persons, who are prejudiced or prepossessed, to put 
false and unequal glosses upon what they give in evidence; and therefore 
the law removes them from testimony, to prevent their sliding into 
perjury; and it can be no injury to truth to remove those from the jury, 
whose testimony may hurt themselves, and can never induce any rational 
belief.28
Another commentator noted that state legislatures not only enacted Dead Man’s 
statute legislation, but they also felt entirely justified with their states’ Dead Man’s 
statutes.29
In time, however, commentators began to point to the confusing nature and 
unfairness of these statutes, noting that certain individuals were not allowed to testify 
because of an assumption that all interested parties are dishonest.  Criticism began to 
grow for these statutes, and, in 1922, the first of many public outcries was published 
demanding the statutes’ revocation.  In 1922, the Commonwealth Trust Fund of New 
York selected a committee of eight persons30 to study this evidentiary rule.31  After 
surveying 300 trial judges and attorneys, the Committee “reached the conclusion that 
the rule was not a necessary protection against false claims, but rather an obstruction 
                                                                
25Owens v. Owens’s Adm’r, 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878). 
26B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 6.1, at 503-04 (1995). 
27Montgomery County v. Herlihy, 575 A.2d 784, 789-90 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). 
28WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 576, at 810 (quoting BARON GILBERT, EVIDENCE 119 
(1726)). 
29Shawn K. Stevens, Comment, The Wisconsin Deadman’s Statute: The Last Surviving 
Vestige of an Abandoned Common Law Rule, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 281, 284-85 (1998). 
30The Committee consisted of Judges William A. Johnston, the Chief Justice of the Kansas 
Supreme Court, Judge Charles M. Hough of the U.S. Court of Appeals, and professors from 
Harvard University, Columbia University, the University of Chicago, Yale University, the 
University of Michigan, and Northwestern University.  See WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 578a, 
at 824 n.1. 
31Id. at 824. 
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to the thorough investigation of truth.”32  Using Connecticut’s evidentiary system as 
a model, the Committee found that a vast majority of those surveyed favored a less-
restrictive Dead Man’s statute.33  The Committee thus urged that New York adopt a 
statute similar to Connecticut’s, which allowed both statements of the interested 
person and statements of the decedent.34
The Dead Man’s statute suffered another blow “[i]n 1938 when the American 
Bar Association’s Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence referred to 
the [D]ead [M]an’s statute as an anachronism and an obstruction to truth.”35  The 
Committee, which consisted of nearly seventy persons from all fifty states and all 
U.S. territories, agreed with the New York Committee and “recommended the 
substitution of a rule similar to the present permissory statue of Connecticut . . . .”36  
Since the ABA’s report, states have enacted legislation to abolish their Dead Man’s 
statutes;37 nevertheless, a number of states have refused to alter or otherwise amend 
the ancient form of disqualification statute.38
While there is no federal Dead Man’s statute,39 the federal government enacted 
legislation affecting the survivability of these acts.  In 1972, the drafters of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence first proposed that an interested requirement be totally 
removed at the federal judiciary level, and proposed Rule 601 was drafted to read 
that “[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as provided in these rules.”40  
Because the remaining Dead Man’s statutes were different in language and scope, 
the Committee proposed that the statutes should no longer have effect in federal 
diversity cases.41  Congress, however, did not go so far as to outlaw Dead Man’s 
statutes; instead, the House Judiciary Committee decided that Dead Man’s statutes 
represented a form of state policy that should not be overturned without a state’s 
input.42  Even though there was “substantial disagreement as to the merit of Dead 
Man’s Statutes,”43 Congress added a second sentence to Rule 601 that noted that “the 
competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with state law.”44  Thus, 
                                                                
32Id. at 825. 
33Id. at 824. 
34Id. at 825. 
35Didisman, supra note 21, at 248 (quoting 36 ABA Rep. 581 (1938)). 
36WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 578a, at 826. 
37For examples of those states that have abolished their Dead Man’s statutes, see supra 
note 9. 
38See infra Part III. 
39MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 36 (2d 
ed. 1988). 
40See FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee’s note. 
41Id. 
42See H.R. REP. NO. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974). 
43Id. at 9. 
44FED. R. EVID. 601; see also GRAHAM, supra note 39, at 36. 
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although the Advisory Committee hoped to do away with these statutes in the 
1970’s, Congress gave a much needed breath of life to Dead Man’s statutes. 
Besides the Advisory Committee, over the past 100 years Dead Man’s statutes 
have survived public policy assaults by a number of distinguished commentators, 
including Dean Wigmore.45  The statutes have also survived challenges brought forth 
under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.46
While these individual challenges have been unsuccessful, states have continued 
to pass legislation that abolishes Dead Man’s statutes.  One such route taken by 
states has been to follow the guidelines enacted by the 1972 Advisory Committee to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Alabama, in 1996, enacted Alabama Rule of 
Evidence 601, which reads as follows: “Every person is competent to be a witness 
except as otherwise provided in these rules.”47  It is unclear whether this rule, which 
is similar to the Advisory Committee’s first proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 601, 
actually abolished the common law Dead Man’s statute in Alabama.48  While the 
Advisory Committee to the Alabama Rules of Evidence notes that the Dead Man’s 
statute has been abrogated, the Alabama Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether 
or not the statute has been officially abolished.49  Nevertheless, one professor at the 
University of Alabama School of Law believes that the Alabama Supreme Court will 
shortly announce via a certified question from federal district court that Rule 601 did 
abrogate the state’s Dead Man’s statute.50   
While Alabama’s Supreme Court has not yet determined whether Rule 601 
abrogated the Alabama Dead Man’s statute, Ohio’s Court of Appeals, in Jenkins v. 
Bazzoli, rejected the Ohio Dead Man’s statute in favor of Ohio Rule of Evidence 
601.51
                                                                
45See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 578; Roy R. Ray, Dead Man’s Statutes, 24 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 89, 110 (1963). 
46See, e.g., In re Estate of Lopata v. Metzel, 641 P.2d 952, 956 (Colo. 1982) (holding that 
the statute involves neither a suspect classification nor an infringement of a fundamental 
right); Russell v. Wolford, 395 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the statute 
did not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses); Murphy v. Hook, 316 N.E.2d 
146, 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (stating that there is “no basis for declaring the Dead Man’s Act 
unconstitutional”). 
47ALA. R. EVID. 601. 
48See ALA. CODE § 12-21-163 (1997). 
49Jerome A. Hoffman, The Alabama Rules of Evidence: Their First Half-Dozen Years, 54 
ALA. L. REV. 241, 295 (2002) (“Whether Alabama’s ‘Dead Man Statute’ has survived the 
stroke awaits determination by the Alabama Supreme Court, which – at last look – had not yet 
addressed the question.”). 
50See e-mail from Charles Gamble, Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of 
Law, to the author (Feb. 28, 2004) (on file with author); see also e-mail from Jerome A. 
Hoffman, Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law, to the author (Mar. 1, 
2004) (on file with author). 
51650 N.E.2d 966 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
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Overall, most states have followed the initial leads of Connecticut and New York 
and have abolished their Dead Man’s statutes.52  Some states, however, retain some 
form of this ancient common law rule and apply the ancient doctrine that because 
“[d]eath has sealed the lips of one of the parties,” legislation should exist to silence 
the remaining interested parties.53
III.  A SURVEY OF STATE DEAD MAN’S STATUTES 
The various Dead Man’s statutes in existence vary widely from state to state; 
therefore, this paper will present an overview of nine states that currently have some 
form of a Dead Man’s statute.54  Because this paper proposes that current Dead 
Man’s statutes unfairly burden certain individuals, this paper will not examine 
certain state Dead Man’s statutes that have partially limited the application of the 
traditional rule.55  Also, in addition to Alabama’s Dead Man’s statute, which may no 
longer be applicable, this paper will also not examine Colorado’s Dead Man’s 
Statute, which was redefined in 2002,56 and Arizona’s Dead Man’s Statute.57
Each Dead Man’s statute is different, in that it affects a different person or is 
limited to a specific type of action, but most of the statutes focus on the same 
criteria.  Overall, Dead Man’s statutes were enacted for the same basic purpose, and 
most statutes are strictly construed to limit their application to a limited set of events; 
however, each of the following nine statutes differ in respect to (1) what type of 
proceeding is required for the statute to apply, (2) who is prohibited from testifying, 
                                                                
52See Simon & Hennessey, supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
53O’Connor v. Slatter, 93 P. 1078, 1079 (Wash. 1908). 
54This article overviews the following states’ Dead Man’s statutes: Florida, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Maryland, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
55See IDAHO CODE § 9-202 (Michie 1997) (noting that certain testimony in writing is 
allowed); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2166 (West 1997) (permitting an interested witness 
to testify as to any communications she had with the deceased if her testimony is supported by 
material evidence tending to corroborate her claim); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-2 (West 1997) 
(noting that interested witnesses can introduce testimony if there is clear and convincing proof 
to support the claim); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4519 (McKinney 1997) (permitting an interested 
witness to testify as to any facts of any automobile, aircraft, or boating accident in which both 
she and the decedent were involved and where the interested witness is claiming negligence); 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5930 (West 1997) (permitting an interested witness to testify as to 
any communications she had with the deceased if the action or proceeding is by or against 
surviving or remaining partners, joint promisors, or joint promisees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,  
§ 1602 (1997) (permitting an interested witness to testify as to any memoranda or declarations 
of the deceased relevant to the matter in issue when the interested witness is suing in tort). 
56The Colorado Dead Man’s statute was only recently revised in 2002; therefore, no case 
law presently exists on the legislature’s newly enacted statute.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-
102 (2002).  For a thorough discussion on the statute, see H. Tucker et al., The New Colorado 
Dead Man’s Statute, 31 COLO. LAW. 7, 119 (2002). 
57In Arizona, the applicability of the Dead Man’s statute is at the discretion of the trial 
court; therefore, because of its subjective application, this paper will not examine the statute.  
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2251 (2003); Troutman v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 826 P.2d 810, 812 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Mahan v. First Nat’l Bank of Arizona, 677 P.2d 301, 303 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1984). 
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(3) what the person is prohibited from testifying about in the trial, and (4) when the 
statute can be waived.  Nevertheless, although each of the nine statutes has different 
characteristics, the statutes all unfairly discriminate against honest persons who are 
prevented from testifying. 
A.  Florida 
Florida’s Dead Man’s statute can be found at Florida Statute chapter 90.602 and 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
No person interested in an action or proceeding against the personal 
representative, heir at law, assignee, legatee, devisee, or survivor of a 
deceased persons, or against the assignee . . . shall be examined as a 
witness regarding any oral communication between the interested persona 
and the person who is deceased or mentally incompetent at the time of the 
examination.58
Florida’s Dead Man’s statute has specific exceptions included in its provisions for 
when the statute does not apply, including (1) when the personal representative or 
similar party is questioned about the oral communication and (2) when evidence 
concerning the oral communication is offered by the personal representative or 
similar party.59  According to the Probate and Trust Litigation Committee of the Real 
Property, Probate and Trust Law section of the Florida Bar Association, “the [Dead 
Man’s] Statute continues to be one of the most difficult statutes to understand in 
considering the exclusion or admissibility of testimony in a probate litigation 
procedure.”60  The Committee is currently reviewing the Dead Man’s statute.61
Florida’s Dead Man’s statute is limited in scope, in that it only applies to actions 
against “the personal representative, heir at law, assignee, legatee, devisee, or 
survivor of a deceased persons, or against the assignee.”62  The person bringing the 
action against this party must also have “a personal and immediate interest in the 
issue being litigated.”63  The statute also only refers to oral communications and not 
to “transactions,” a term used in most state Dead Man’s statutes.64  When Florida 
limited its Dead Man’s statute in 1976, the statute was worded so that it “only 
excludes testimony that refers to conversations between an interested party and a 
deceased person.  It does not exclude written testimony by an interested party 
regarding written transactions or communications with a deceased person.”65  The 
                                                                
58FLA. STAT. ch. 90.602 (2003). 
59Id. 
60Florida Bar Association, Probate and Trust Litigation Committee, at 
http://www.flagbarpptl.org/pt_litigation.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2004). 
61Id. 
62FLA. STAT. ch. 90.602(1) (2003). 
63Walton v. Estate of Walton, 601 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (citing 
Estate of Parson, 416 So. 2d 513, 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)). 
64See Sun Bank/Miami, N.A. v. Saewitz, 579 So. 2d 255, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
65Id. 
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statute also does not exclude “[t]estimony regarding nonverbal conduct, such as 
execution, delivery, and negotiation of a contract . . . .”66  Florida’s revision of its 
Dead Man’s statute reduced the scope of potential litigation surrounding the statute, 
but the revisions did not prevent the fraudulent and unfair treatment of honest 
persons in court. 
Practitioners can waive the statute’s application, and “many practitioners 
inadvertently waive the [Dead Man’s] statute and the potential impact it could have 
on their cases.”67  Overall, the Dead Man’s statute is waived when the protected party 
introduces or relies on evidence that relates to the oral communication.68  One recent 
case, In re Estate of Stetzko v. Coleman,69 dealt a harsh blow to the future availability 
of the Dead Man’s statute in will contest cases.  In Stetzko, the court held that a party 
will waive the applicability of the statute if any written or documentary evidence 
concerning the subject matter of the litigation is entered into evidence.70  Thus, “in 
most, if not all, will contests, the statute will be waived because the person 
attempting to uphold the will must first introduce it was properly executed.”71
B.  Indiana 
The Indiana Dead Man’s statute, located at Indiana Code Annotated § 34-45-2-4, 
provides, in part, that “a person (1) who is a necessary party to the issue or record; 
and (2) whose interest is adverse to the estate; is not a competent witness as to 
matters against the estate.”72  “[T]he purpose of this statute is to protect decedents’ 
estates from spurious claims,”73 and fairness is no justification for a trial judge to 
ignore the specific instructions of the statute.74  The statute is most commonly 
applied in Indiana “when an executor or administrator of an estate is one party, [and] 
the adverse parties are not competent to testify about transactions that took place 
during the lifetime of the decedent.”75
For the statute to be applied, the moving party must establish multiple criteria, 
including (1) that the personal representative is a party to the lawsuit, (2) that there 
could be a judgment against the estate, (3) that the testifying witness is a party to the 
lawsuit and has an interest in the outcome of the lawsuit, (4) that the action involves 
some “matter” that occurred when the decedent was alive, and (5) that the statute has 
not been waived.  If the preceding criteria are met, the witness cannot testify “as to 
                                                                
66Bauerle v. Brush, 820 So. 2d 310, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); see also Carpenter v. 
ex. rel. Wemyss, 638 So. 2d 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Saewitz, 579 So. 2d 255. 
67Simon & Hennessey, supra note 8, at 145. 
68See FLA. STAT. ch. 90.602(2)(b) (2003); see also Moneyhun v. Vital Indus., 611 So. 2d 
1316, 1320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
69714 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
70Id. at 1090. 
71Id. (quoting CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 602.1, at 358-59 (1997)). 
72IND. CODE ANN. § 34-45-2-4 (Michie 2003). 
73In re Estate of Lambert v. Southard, 785 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
74Id. 
75Id.; see also J.M. Corp. v. Roberson, 749 N.E.2d 567, 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 
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matters against the estate,”76 but the witness could still testify as to “matters that 
occurred while the decedent was alive.”77  A “matter” under the statute “includes 
transactions or actions as well as conversations.”78  Witnesses prevented from 
testifying in the trial court are also prevented from authenticating documents and 
other tangible evidence that is somehow related to the “matter” with the decedent.79
First, the statute will only apply “to all cases in which a judgment may result for 
or against the estate, notwithstanding the parties’ positions as plaintiff or 
defendant.”80  Thus, following the language established by the Indiana Court of 
Appeals, the judgment must “either directly or indirectly affect the estate of the 
decedent.”81  This initial provision also requires that the personal representative be a 
party to the lawsuit.82  Thus, defendants in wrongful death actions are not prohibited 
from testifying, because the wrongful death action is not brought against the estate.83  
In addition, if for some reason the statute of limitations or otherwise the passage of 
time has prevented the decedent’s estate from being held liable for damages, 
testimony by interested witnesses or parties is allowed because the Dead Man’s 
statute does “not intend . . . to prevent testimony that could not, in any way, affect 
the estate assets.”84
Second, the moving party must show the witness is a party to the issue or record 
and that the party has some interest in the outcome to the lawsuit.85  The Indiana 
Court of Appeals has held that a witness has an interest in the proceeding when “the 
witness will gain or lose by the direct legal operation of that judgment.”86  
Nevertheless, a witness’s testimony will be excluded only if the witness is a party to 
the issue.  “A party to the issue means the parties between whom there is a 
controversy submitted to the court for trial, the parties who are litigating the 
particular issue against whom or for whom the court will render judgment.”87  The 
moving party must establish both of these criteria. 
Third, the moving party must establish that the event occurred in the decedent’s 
lifetime and that the statute has not been waived.  While proving that an event 
                                                                
76IND. CODE ANN. § 34-45-2-4 (Michie 2003). 
77Johnson v. Estate of Rayburn, 587 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). 
78In re Estate of Sutherland, 204 N.E.2d 520, 523 (Ind. 1965). 
79State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Ft. Wayne Nat’l Bank, 474 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1985); see also Merritt v. Straw, 33 N.E. 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 1893). 
80In re Estate of Loubert, , 785 N.E.2d at 1132. 
81Jenkins v. Nachand, 290 N.E.2d 763, 768-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972). 
82Johnson v. Estate of Rayburn, 587 N.E.2d 182, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). 
83Goldman v. Cha, 704 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); see also Lake E. & W. R. 
Co. v. Charman, 67 N.E. 923 (Ind. 1903). 
84Jenkins, 290 N.E.2d at 769. 
85See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-45-2-4(b) (Michie 2003). 
86In re Estate of Lambert v. Southard, 785 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); see 
also Satterthwaite v. Estate of Satterthwaite, 420 N.E.2d 287, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). 
87Satterthwaite, 420 N.E.2d at 290. 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
86 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:75 
occurred within the decedent’s lifetime is self-explanatory, Indiana practitioners can 
waive the Dead Man’s statute’s application if the practitioner “opens the door” by 
questioning the witness or if the practitioner enters the deposition testimony of the 
decedent taken while the decedent was alive.88
C.  Louisiana 
Louisiana’s Dead Man’s statute is slightly different than other jurisdictions in 
that it allows parol evidence, so long as certain conditions are met.  More 
specifically, the statute, found at Louisiana Revised Statute Annotated § 13:3721, 
reads: 
Parol evidence shall not be received to prove any debt or liability of a 
deceased person against his succession representative, heirs, or legatees 
when no suit to enforce it has been brought against the deceased prior to 
his death, unless within one year of the death of the deceased: (1) A suit to 
enforce the debt or liability is brought against the succession 
representative, heirs, or legatees of the deceased; (2) The debt or liability 
is acknowledged by the succession representative as provided in Article 
3242 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or by his placing it on a tableau of 
distribution, or petitioning for authority to pay it; (3) The claimant has 
opposed a petition for authority to pay debts, or a tableau of distribution, 
filed by the succession representative, on the ground that it did not include 
the debt or liability in question; or (4) The claimant has submitted to the 
succession representative a formal proof of his claim against the 
succession, as provided in Article 3245 of the Code of Civil Procedure.89
Although this statute will, at times, allow an interested party to testify against the 
estate of the decedent, the statute still prevents “stale and unfounded claims from 
being filed against the succession which could have been refuted by the decedent had 
he been alive.”90  Louisiana courts are to strictly construe the statute.91
To help prevent fraudulent claims against an estate, Louisiana first requires that 
all claims against an estate be filed within one year of the death of the decedent.92  
Second, Louisiana will allow certain testimony about a debt against an estate, 
including the testimony of the claimant; however, “the debt or liability of the 
deceased must be proved by the testimony of at least one creditable witness other 
than the claimant, and other corroborating circumstances.”93  The “one credible 
interest,” however, cannot have an interest in the claim.94  “[A] person who has a 
                                                                
88Kalwitz v. Estate of Kalwitz, 759 N.E.2d 228, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see also IND. 
CODE ANN. § 34-45-2-4(e) (Michie 2003). 
89LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3721 (West 2003). 
90In re Succession of Moore, 696 So. 2d 1040, 1041 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 
91In re Succession of Larmore, 518 So. 2d 1085, 1087 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
92 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3721 (West 2003). 
93Harper v. Wells Estate, 575 So. 2d 894, 897 (La. Ct. App. 1991). 
94Id. at 898 (citing Savoie v. Estate of Rogers, 410 So. 2d 683, 687 (La. 1981)). 
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direct pecuniary or proprietary interest in the plaintiff's claim against the deceased 
person may not serve as the one creditable witness” against the estate.95
D.  Maryland 
Maryland’s Dead Man’s statute was “[f]irst enacted by Chapter 109, Acts of 
1864, [and] the Maryland Dead Man statute remains merely a remnant of the 
common law disqualification of all interested witnesses.”96  The statute, found in 
Maryland Code Annotated, Courts and Judicial Proceeding § 9-116, reads: 
A party to a proceeding by or against a personal representative, heir, 
devisee, distributee, or legatee as such, in which a judgment or decree 
may be rendered for or against them, or by or against an incompetent 
person, may not testify concerning any transaction with or statement made 
by the dead or incompetent person, personally or through an agent since 
dead, unless called to testify by the opposite party, or unless the testimony 
of the dead or incompetent person has been given already in evidence in 
the same proceeding concerning the same transaction or statement.97
Similar to most states, Maryland enacted their Dead Man’s statute “to equalize 
the parties' positions by imposing silence on the survivors as to transactions with or 
statements by the decedent and thereby require those who have asserted a claim 
against the decedent's estate to produce testimony from disinterested persons.”98  
Maryland courts, however, “consistently ha[ve] favored the admission of 
testimony”99 and the qualification of a witness is largely at the discretion of the trial 
court.100
Because Maryland courts have favored admitting evidence, the Dead Man’s 
statute applies only when the suit is brought “by or against a personal representative, 
heir, devisee, distributee, or legatee.”101  Moreover, only certain parties are excluded 
from testifying at the trial court.  A “party,” as defined by the Maryland Court of 
Appeals in Reddy v. Mody is “one who has an interest in the property sought or a 
person having a direct pecuniary and proprietary interest in the outcome of the 
case.”102  The court in Mody goes on to note that “[e]xcept in very unusual cases, the 
persons excluded from testifying are not those with an interest of any sort, but rather 
traditional real parties in interest and their representatives.”103  Maryland’s statute is 
                                                                
95Savoie v. Estate of Rogers, 410 So. 2d 683, 687 (La. 1981). 
96Herbert J. Belgrad, Note, The Effect of the Dead Man’s Statute on the Testimony of 
Party-Witnesses: Ridgley v. Beatty, 21 MD. L. REV. 60, 64 (1961). 
97MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-116 (2002). 
98Walton v. Davy, 586 A.2d 760, 765 (Md. Ct. App. 1991). 
99Id. 
100Davis v. Corbin, 346 A.2d 488, 495 (Md. Ct. App. 1975). 
101MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-116 (2002). 
102Reddy v. Mody, 388 A.2d 555, 560 (Md. Ct. App. 1978) (citations omitted). 
103Id. 
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thus extremely limited in scope, allowing attorneys,104 third parties and the like to 
testify in proceedings.105  In Maryland, the Dead Man’s statute does not apply to 
actions brought by the beneficiary of an insurance contract106 or by “an officer, 
director, or shareholder of a corporate party.”107  The statute also does not apply in 
wrongful death actions, as “money recovered by [one party] is received by them in 
their own right and not through the estate of the deceased because of their status as 
heir, devisee, distributee or legatee.”108
The Maryland Dead Man’s statute applies only to “testimony of a party to a 
cause which would tend to increase or diminish the estate of the decedent.”109  
Furthermore, this testimony must involve a “transaction” with the decedent.  The 
Maryland Supreme Court in Ridgley v. Beatty110 relied on a New Jersey Supreme 
Court opinion to develop a test for what is and what is not a transaction. Thus, in 
Beatty, the Court announced that “for determining what is a ‘transaction with’ a 
decedent in the statutory sense . . . [one should ask] ‘[w]hether, in case the witness 
testify falsely, the deceased, if living, could contradict it of his own knowledge.’”111   
Maryland’s courts are required to strictly construe the statute “in order to disclose 
as much of the evidence as possible.”112  Courts, nevertheless, must allow testimony 
if a party trigger’s the statutes first exception, the admission of “testimony of the 
dead or incompetent person.”113  As noted by the Maryland Court of Appeals in 
Hamilton v. Caplan,114 testimony is “evidence given by a competent witness, under 
oath or affirmation, as distinguished from evidence derived from writings, and other 
sources.”115  Because the admission of the decedent’s testimony would further the 
purpose of the statute, by placing both parties on equal ground, courts must admit a 
witness’s testimony if it relates to the decedent.116  The statute’s second exception is 
triggered when a party “opens the door” by cross-examining or otherwise 
questioning the witness about a “transaction” or statement with the decedent.117
                                                                
104See, e.g., Walton v. Davy, 586 A.2d 760 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that an attorney, 
who was not a beneficiary and did not represent a beneficiary, was allowed to testify). 
105Ebert v. Ritchey, 458 A.2d 891, 896 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the Dead Man’s 
statute applies to “testimony by parties, not by third persons”). 
106Stout v. Home Life Ins. Co., 651 F. Supp. 28, 31 (D. Md. 1986). 
107Guernsey v. Loyal Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 172 A.2d 506, 507 (Md. Ct. App. 1961). 
108Reddy, 388 A.2d at 559. 
109Id.  
110Ridgely v. Beaty, 159 A.2d 651 (Md. Ct. App. 1960). 
111Id. at 655 (quoting Hollister v. Fiedler, 111 A.2d 57, 62 (N.J. 1955)). 
112Reddy, 388 A.2d at 560; see also Stacy v. Burke, 269 A.2d 837, 845 (Md. Ct. App. 
1970). 
113MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-116 (2002). 
114Hamilton v. Caplan, 518 A.2d 1087 (Md. Ct. App. 1987). 
115Id. at 1095 (quoting Reddy, 388 A.2d at 560). 
116Id.; see also Reddy, 388 A.2d at 560. 
117Kaouris v. Kaouris, 603 A.2d 1350, 1353-54 (Md. Ct. App. 1992). 
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E.  South Carolina 
South Carolina’s Dead Man’s statute can be found at South Carolina Code 
Annotated § 19-11-20 and reads, in part: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 19-11-10, no party to an action or 
proceeding, no person who has a legal or equitable interest which may be 
affected by the event of the action or proceeding, no person who, previous 
to such examination, has had such an interest, however the same may have 
been transferred or come to the party to the action or proceeding, and no 
assignor of anything in controversy in the action shall be examined in 
regard to any transaction or communication between such witness and a 
person at the time of such examination deceased, insane or lunatic as a 
witness against a party then prosecuting or defending the action as 
executor, administrator, heir-at-law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee 
or survivor of such deceased person or as assignee or committee of such 
insane person or lunatic, when such examination or any judgment or 
determination in such action or proceeding can in any manner affect the 
interest of such witness or the interest previously owned or represented by 
him.118
While the statute is longer than most other state’s Dead Man’s statutes, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court noted in Hanahan v. Simpson119 that “the rule prohibits any 
interested person from testifying concerning conversations or transactions with the 
decedent if the testimony could affect his or her interest.”120  The Hanahan court 
went on to note that “[t]he rule is founded on the principle that it is against public 
policy to allow a witness thus interested to testify as to matters when such testimony, 
if untrue, cannot be contradicted.”121  Courts in South Carolina narrowly construe the 
statute “to limit its applicability to cases which clearly fall within its intended 
note.”122
South Carolina courts have determined that the Dead Man’s statute applies only 
in a number of limited circumstances.  Three main criteria need to be proven for the 
statute to apply: (1) there must exist some transaction or communication between the 
witness and the deceased; (2) the lawsuit must be against or brought by the executor, 
administrator, heir-at-law, next of kin or the like of the decedent, and (3) the 
outcome of the lawsuit must affect a present interest of the witness.123
First, the statute is applicable only to those persons who are “interested” in the 
outcome of the lawsuit.124  “As such, a person is only disqualified if he or she has a 
                                                                
118S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-20 (Law Co-op. 2003). 
119Hanahan v. Simpson, 485 S.E.2d 903 (S.C. 1997). 
120Id. at 909. 
121Id.; see also Harris v. Berry, 98 S.E.2d 251 (S.C. 1957); Trimmier v. Thomson, 19 S.E. 
291 (S.C. 1894). 
122Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 909 (citations omitted). 
123Kelly v. Peeples, 362 S.E.2d 636, 638 (S.C. 1987). 
124 S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-20 (Law Co-op. 2003). 
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certain or vested legal or equitable interest which may be affected by the direct, legal 
operation of the judgment.”125  Possible or future interests are thus not enough for 
South Carolina courts; instead, the South Carolina Court of Appeals, in In re Estate 
of Mason v. Mason,126 noted: 
The four classes [of persons to whom the Dead Man’s statute applies] are 
(1) a party to the action, (2) a person having an interest which may be 
affected by the trial's outcome, (3) a person who previously had an interest 
which may be affected by the trial, and (4) an assignor of the thing in 
controversy.127
“Interest” means the witness will “either gain or lose by the direct legal operation 
and effect of the judgment.”128  Therefore, if a witness does not stand to gain or lose 
from the judgment, such as an attorney representing the estate, he or she will be 
considered competent to testify.129
Second, the statute applies only to “transactions” between the witness and the 
decedent.130  The testimony about the transaction must involve the witness and the 
decedent, it must be offered against the estate, and it must affect the witness’s 
interest.131  “Transactions,” however, do not include “the acts, demeanor or conduct 
of the decedent where the testimony is offered merely for its bearing on an issue of 
mental competency.”132  In addition, because a transaction requires mutuality 
between the witness and the decedent, accidents, such as boat and trailer accidents 
and car accidents, are not considered “transactions” under the Dead Man’s statute.133  
Witnesses, however, may testify to transactions between the decedent and a third 
person,134 and witnesses may testify against his or her own interest.135  Witnesses and 
parties may also introduce documentary evidence.136
A party can waive the statute’s applicability when the representative of the estate 
“opens the door” by offering testimony and evidence that would have been excluded 
                                                                
125Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 910; see also Long v. Conroy, 143 S.E.2d 459, 462 (S.C. 
1965). 
126In re Estate of Mason, 346 S.E.2d 28 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986). 
127Id. at 31 n.2 (citing Long v. Conroy, 143 S.E.2d 459 (S.C. 1965)). 
128Conroy, 143 S.E.2d at 463. 
129Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 910; see also Havird v. Schissell, 166 S.E.2d 801 (S.C. 1969) 
(holding that an attorney was not disqualified even though he stood to collect an ordinary and 
usual fee from the proceeding). 
130See S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-20 (Law. Co-op. 2003). 
131In re Estate of Mason v. Mason, 346 S.E.2d 28, 31-32 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986). 
132Havird, 166 S.E.2d at 806. 
133See Starnes v. Miller, 266 S.E.2d 790, 791 (S.C. 1980). 
134See Moore v. Trimmier, 11 S.E. 548 (S.C. 1889); see also Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 910. 
135See Devereux v. McCrady, 24 S.E. 77 (S.C. 1896); Shell v. Boyd, 11 S.E. 205 (S.C. 
1890); see also Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 910. 
136See Harris v. Berry, 98 S.E.2d 251 (S.C. 1957); see also Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 910. 
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under the statute.137  The statute is also waived when the representative of the estate 
fails to object to testimony at the trial court.138
F.  Tennessee 
Tennessee enacted its Dead Man’s statute to prevent the surviving party from 
having some sort of advantage when a decedent’s representative is disadvantaged for 
not being able to recount the decedent’s version of the transaction or statement.139  
Enacted in 1869, Tennessee’s Dead Man’s statute can be found at Tennessee Code 
Annotated § 24-1-203 and reads: 
In actions or proceedings by or against executors, administrators, or 
guardians, in which judgments may be rendered for or against them, 
neither party shall be allowed to testify against the other as to any 
transaction with or statement by the testator, intestate, or ward, unless 
called to testify thereto by the opposite party.  If a corporation is a party, 
this disqualification shall extend to its officers of every grade and its 
directors.140
In 2003 the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the Dead Man’s Statute “prohibits 
an interested party in a proceeding involving the estate of a deceased person from 
testifying as to transaction or statements by the deceased, unless the interested party 
was called to testify by the opposite party.”141
For the statute to apply in Tennessee, “the proposed witness must be a party to 
the suit in such a way that judgment may be rendered for or against him . . . [and] the 
subject matter of his testimony must be of some transaction with or statement by the 
testator or intestate.”142  Tennessee’s statute is thus more liberal than some states, as 
it does not apply to statements made by non-parties,143 even if the non-party has an 
interest in the litigation.144  The statute also does not apply to statements by parties 
that neither increase nor decrease the size of the decedent’s estate.145  Thus, if the 
outcome of the case would require the estate to pay the successful party regardless of 
the litigation’s outcome, the testimony will not be excluded.146  In addition, while 
                                                                
137Hanahan, 485 S.E.2d at 909-10; see also Norris v. Clinkscales, 25 S.E. 797 (S.C. 
1896); Thomas v. Taylor, 386 S.E.2d 630 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989). 
138See Pinkerton v. Jones, 423 S.E.2d 151, 153 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992); Harris v. Campbell, 
358 S.E.2d 719, 720 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).  
139See Baker v. Baker, 142 S.W.2d 737 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940). 
140TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-203 (2003). 
141Estate of Myers v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank Corp., No. M2002-00888-COA-R3-CV, 
2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 612, at *13-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2003). 
142Estate of Pritchard v. McDonald, 735 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). 
143Gibson v. Parkey, 217 S.W. 647, 648 (Tenn. 1919). 
144See Montague v. Thomason, 18 S.W. 264, 265 (Tenn. 1892). 
145Cantrell v. Estate of Cantrell, 19 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Baker, 
142 S.W.2d at 744). 
146Beadles v. Alexander, 68 Tenn. 604 (1877). 
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
92 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:75 
Tennessee extended the Dead Man’s statute in 1947 to include officers and directors 
of corporations, Tennessee courts have refused to extend the statute to other forms of 
agency.147
While an interested party to the lawsuit is excluded from testifying, “the Dead 
Man’s Statute applies only in cases ‘by or against executors, administrators, or 
guardians.’”148  Thus, “where an action is brought against a surviving party in his or 
her individual capacity only, the statute does not apply.”149  Witnesses are not 
prevented from testifying as to transactions between him or herself and a third 
party.150
The decedent’s personal representative can testify in limited circumstances when 
multiple parties are involved.  “Where there are multiple parties to a lawsuit, one of 
whom is [the personal representative], that witness can still testify as to the 
transaction with the decedent as to the other parties to the suit, even though [the 
statute] renders a witness incompetent to testify against the estate.”151  Because the 
estate would not be diminished if the personal representative’s testimony is favorable 
to the estate, such testimony would also be allowed. 
While there exists little case law in Tennessee as to what constitutes a 
transaction, it is clear that a transaction can be either oral or in writing.152  The 
Tennessee Supreme Court noted that transactions “refer to things done in the 
intestate’s presence, to which he might testify of his personal knowledge, if alive, not 
to transactions out of his hearing and presence, though affecting liability of his 
estate.”153  The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in Watts v. Rayman, has further defined 
a transaction to include “matters of personal communication between the claimant 
and the deceased.”154  The Court of Appeals has also held that transactions can occur 
via tort actions.155  Overall, following the Tennessee Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Kurn v. Weaver, the Dead Man’s statute will come into play when “judgment may be 
rendered for the representative party and against the proposed witness, or vice 
versa.”156
Similar to other states, Tennessee’s Dead Man’s statute can be waived if the 
interested party is called to testify and the opposing attorney (1) neglects to object to 
                                                                
147See Pritchard, 735 S.W.2d at 449. 
148In re Estate of Burress, No. E2002-00320-COA-R3-CV 2003 WL 238820, at *5 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2003). 
149Id.; see also Hooper v. Neubert, 381 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963); McKamey v. 
Andrews, 289 S.W.2d 704 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955). 
150Waggoner v. Dorris, 68 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933). 
151Haynes v. Cumberland Builders, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976). 
152Montague, 18 S.W. at 265. 
153Newman v. Tipton, 234 S.W.2d 994, 996 (Tenn. 1950) (quoting Waggoner, 68 S.W.2d 
at 145. 
154Watts v. Rayman, 462 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970). 
155Christofiel v. Johnson, 290 S.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956). 
156Kurn v. Weaver, 161 S.W.2d 1005, 1021 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940). 
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his or her testimony and (2) cross-examines the witness.157  On the other hand, 
Tennessee law protects the parties from cross-examining a witness who testifies over 
objection158 and during discovery proceedings, as one party can depose the other 
party without having to worry about waiving the Dead Man’s statute.159  This does 
not include a situation where a party is deposed before trial and then dies after giving 
his or her deposition.  In these cases, because both parties had the benefit of their 
own testimony, the purpose of the Dead Man’s statute is not invoked, and the 
testimony is allowed.160
In Tennessee, the Dead Man’s statute “cannot be extended by the courts to cases 
not within its terms upon the idea they fall within the evil which was intended to be 
guarded against.”161  In other words, the Tennessee statute must be strictly 
construed.162  The competency of the witness is nevertheless to be determined by the 
trial judge.163
G.  Washington 
Washington’s Dead Man’s statute is found at Revised Code of Washington 
section 5.60.030 and states: 
No person offered as a witness shall be excluded from giving evidence by 
reason of his or her interest in the event of the action, as a party thereto or 
otherwise, but such interest may be shown to affect his or her credibility: 
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That in an action or proceeding where the 
adverse party sues or defends as executor, administrator or legal 
representative of any deceased person, or as deriving right or title by, 
through or from any deceased person, or as the guardian or limited 
guardian of the estate or person of any incompetent or disabled person, or 
of any minor under the age of fourteen years, then a party in interest or to 
the record, shall not be admitted to testify in his or her own behalf as to 
any transaction had by him or her with, or any statement made to him or 
her, or in his or her presence, by any such deceased, incompetent or 
disabled person, or by any such minor under the age of fourteen years: 
PROVIDED FURTHER, That this exclusion shall not apply to parties of 
record who sue or defend in a representative or fiduciary capacity, and 
have no other or further interest in the action.164
                                                                
157Rose v. Stalcup, 731 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). 
158Leffew v. Mayes, 685 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that “where 
transactions with the dedecent are first developed on direct examination over objection of the 
representative of the decedent, the objection is not waived by subsequent cross-examination”); 
see also Nabors v. Gearhiser, 525 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tenn. 1975). 
159See Ingram v. Phillips, 684 S.W.2d 954, 958-59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). 
160Bernard v. Reaves, 178 S.W.2d 224, 227-28 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943). 
161Haynes, 546 S.W.2d at 230. 
162Id. at 231; see also Newman, 234 S.W.2d at 996; Christofiel, 290 S.W.2d at 218. 
163Roy v. Sanford, 204 S.W. 1159, 1161 (Tenn. 1918). 
164WASH. REV. CODE, § 5.60.030 (2003). 
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The statute, which has contained roughly the same language since 1881,165 is 
designed to “prevent interested parties from giving self-serving testimony about 
conversations or transactions with the decedent.”166  The statute protects estate from 
fraud and invasion.167
First, a “party in interest” in Washington covers “one who stands to gain or lose 
in the action in question.”168  Thus, a “party in action” need not be limited to an 
actual party in the lawsuit; however, third parties are not excluded under 
Washington’s statute.169  Non-natural parties, including corporations and agents to 
corporations, 170 and certain employees171 are also not prevented from testifying. 
Second, a transaction, under the statute, “is broadly defined as the doing or 
performing of some business between parties, or the management of any affair”172 
and includes events “much broader than a contract” between the decedent and the 
witness.173  The subject matter of testimony will fit the definition of a “transaction” 
when “the deceased, if living, could contradict the witness of his own knowledge.”174  
“[T]he testimony must indicate that the decedent was both present and directly 
involved in the matter at hand.”175  In addition, if the proffered testimony “tends to 
show either what did or did not take place between the parties, it must be excluded so 
long as it concerns the transaction or justifies an inference as to what it really 
was.”176  A party in action, nevertheless, can testify about “his or her own feelings or 
impressions” of the decedent in the lawsuit.177
                                                                
165Patrick A. Trudell, Comment, The Deadman’s Statute in Washington, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 
501, 504 (1979). 
166Wildman v. Taylor, 731 P.2d 541, 543 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); see also Erikson v. Kerr, 
883 P.2d 313, 316 (Wash. 1994). 
167Estate of Lennon v. Lennon, 29 P.3d 1258, 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
168Id. at 1263; see also Bentzen v. Demmons, 842 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). 
169Erikson, 883 P.2d at 316; see also Rabb v. Estate of McDermott, 803 P.2d 819, 823 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1991); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Boober, 784 P.2d 186, 189 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1990). 
170Thor v. McDearmid, 817 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). 
171See, e.g., McLean v. Archer, 201 P.2d 184 (Wash. 1948) (holding that a secretary and 
bookkeeper of a corporation was allowed to testify); May v. Triple C Convalescent Ctrs., 578 
P.2d 541 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a nurse at a nursing home was allowed to 
testify). 
172Lennon, 29 P.3d at 1263 (quoting Bentzen, 842 P.2d at 1019) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
173In re Shaughnessy’s Estate, 648 P.2d 427, 429 (Wash. 1982). 
174Lennon, 29 P.3d at 1263. 
175Id. at 1265. 
176Id. at 1263; see also Martin v. Shaen, 173 P.2d 968, 971 (Wash. 1946). 
177Lennon, 29 P.3d at 1263; see also Jacobs v. Brock, 437 P.2d 920, 922 (Wash. 1968). 
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This statute, however, applies only to oral evidence and actions of the 
decedent.178  “[R]ecords kept in the ordinary course of business,”179 “documents 
written or executed by the deceased,”180 and “other documents relating to the 
transaction at issue”181 are not excluded via an application of the statute.  Testimony 
about these written documents, however, could be limited by application of the Dead 
Man’s statute.182
Washington’s Dead Man’s statute can be waived under three separate 
circumstances: “the failure to object to the evidence, by cross-examination that is not 
within the scope of direct examination, or by presenting testimony favorable to the 
estate.”183  First, as noted by the Washington Court of Appeals in In re Estate of 
Lennon v. Lennon,184 “[f]ailure to timely object to the testimony of an interested 
party waives the bar of the deadman’s statute.”185  This objection must occur in 
contested hearings.186  Second, Lennon also notes that “[o]nce the protected party has 
opened the door, the interested party is entitled to rebuttal.”187  This door, however, is 
not opened by taking depositions or serving interrogatories during the discovery 
portion of the trial, so long as some portion of the deposition transcript or other 
evidence related to the transaction is not introduced in the trial court as evidence.188  
If the representative of the estate enters such evidence, the statute’s application will 
be waived.189
H.  West Virginia 
The West Virginia Dead Man’s statute, first adopted in 1868, states, in relevant 
part, that: 
                                                                
178Bentzen, 842 P.2d at 1019. 
179Erikson, 883 P.2d at 316; see, e.g., Sanborn v. Dentler, 166 P. 62, 64 (Wash. 1917); 
Goldsworthy v. Oliver, 160 P. 4, 5 (Wash. 1916); Ah How v. Furth, 43 P. 639, 640 (Wash. 
1896); Vogt v. Hovander, 616 P.2d 660, 662-63 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). 
180Erikson, 883 P.2d at 316; see, e.g, Hampton v. Gilleland, 379 P.2d 194, 197-98 (Wash. 
1963); Denis v. Metzenbaum, 213 P. 453, 454 (Wash. 1923); Slavin v. Ackman, 204 P. 816, 
817 (Wash. 1922); Kauffman v. Baillie, 89 P. 548, 550-51 (Wash. 1907). 
181Erikson, 883 P.2d at 316; see also Bentzen, 842 P.2d at 1015 (waiver by submission of 
affidavit of decedent's son regarding transaction in support of summary judgment); Thor, 817 
P.2d at 1384 (waiver by introduction of letter written to decedent). 
182Wildman, 731 P.2d at 545-46. 
183Stranberg v. Lasz, 63 P.3d 809, 813 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); see also Botka v. Estate of 
Hoerr, 21 P.3d 723, 726 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
184Lennon v. Lennon, 29 P.3d 1258 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
185Id. at 1264. 
186Id. 
187Id. at 1263; see also Johnston v. Medina Imp. Club, Inc., 116 P.2d 272 (Wash. 1941). 
188Lennon, 29 P.3d at 1263 (2001); see also McGugart v. Brumback, 463 P.2d 140, 144 
(Wash. 1969). 
189Lennon, 29 P.3d at 1263-64. 
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No party to any action, suit or proceeding, nor any person interested in the 
event thereof, nor any person from, through or under whom any such 
party or interested person derives any interest or title by assignment or 
otherwise, shall be examined as a witness in regard to any personal 
transaction or communication between such witness and a person at the 
time of such examination, deceased, insane or lunatic, against the 
executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee 
or survivor of such person, or the assignee or committee of such insane 
person or lunatic.190
Premised on the belief that “there is a very strong temptation to lie or to conceal 
material facts to the detriment of the decedent’s representative,”191 the purpose of the 
statute, as defined by the West Virginia Supreme Court, “is to prevent the injustice 
that would result from a surviving party to a transaction testifying favorably to 
himself or herself and adversely to the interest of a decedent, when the decedent’s 
representatives would be hampered in attempting to refute the testimony by reason of 
the decedent’s death.”192  Instead of disqualifying the testimony itself, West Virginia 
disqualifies the witness alone, giving third parties the right to testify to matters that 
would be prevented by the statute.193
In the 1996 case Meadows v. Meadows, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia established new guidelines for applying the West Virginia Dead Man’s 
statute and further limited the previously broad scope of the statute.194  Although 
West Virginia Rule of Evidence 601 notes that “[e]very person is competent to be a 
witness except as otherwise provided for by statute or these rules,”195 Rule 601 defers 
to the state legislature to determine the competency of witnesses.196  More 
importantly, “the primary purpose for providing for the exception in Rule 601 was to 
protect the integrity of the West Virginia Dead Man’s Statute.”197  Rule 601 did not 
abolish the Dead Man’s statute.198
When applying the West Virginia statute to a proceeding, “the language of the 
Dead Man’s statute should be strictly construed and limited to its narrowest 
application.”199  After all, as the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia notes, a 
restrictive application of the statute promotes “an enhanced confidence in the jury 
                                                                
190W. VA. CODE § 57-3-1 (2003). 
191Cross v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 387 S.E.2d 556, 561 n.6 (W. Va. 
1989). 
192Meadows v. Meadows, 468 S.E.2d 309, 313 (W. Va. 1996). 
193Id. 
194Id. at 312. 
195W. VA. R. EVID. 601. 
196Meadows, 468 S.E.2d at 313. 
197Id. 
198Cross, 387 S.E.2d at 560 (1989). 
199Meadows, 468 S.E.2d at 314 (citing Harper v. Johnson, 345 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Tex. 
1961)). 
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system and the role of the adversarial cross-examination.”200  When applying the 
statute, the court should ensure that (1) the witness is a party to or is interested in the 
lawsuit and (2) that the testimony involves some communication or some personal 
transaction with one of the statutorily-listed persons.201
For the statute to apply, a witness must either be a party to the lawsuit or be 
“interested” in the outcome of the proceeding.  Parties to lawsuits, even if they have 
no interest in the lawsuit’s outcome, are not allowed to testify.202  Interested persons, 
as defined in Coleman v. Wallace203 to include those persons who can be affected by 
the result of the suit, are also prohibited from testifying.204  To exclude testimony, the 
interest must be definite and present, not somehow contingent or remote.205
While a “communication” is somewhat self-explanatory, the Meadows court 
narrowed the definition of “personal transaction” to “requiring something in the 
nature of a negotiation or a course of conduct or a mutuality of responsibility 
resulting from the voluntary conduct of opposing parties . . . [such as] when one 
enters upon a course of conduct after a knowing exchange of reciprocal acts or 
conversations.”206  Because it is not a transaction, the statute “does not bar a party or 
interested witness from testifying as to the deceased’s appearance and demeanor and 
the witness may give an opinion as to the deceased’s competency . . . .”207  A witness 
is also not prevented from testifying against his or her own interest in the lawsuit.208
As with other states, the disqualification of a witness via the Dead Man’s statute 
is waived in certain circumstances.  First, a party waives the right to apply the Dead 
Man’s statute if the party calls the witness on its own behalf.209  Second, if the 
personal representative opens the door by testifying against the claim of some 
interested party, the previously excluded witnesses are allowed to testify as to the 
specific matter mentioned by the personal representative.210  The witness’s 
responsive testimony, however, should be limited to explaining, rebutting or 
otherwise denying the testimony by the personal representative.211  Third, application 
                                                                
200Id. at 314 (quoting FRANKLIN D. CLECKLEY, HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE FOR WEST 
VIRGINIA LAWYERS § 1-4(A) (3d ed. 1994)). 
201See W. VA. CODE § 57-3-1 (2003). 
202Hudkins v. Crim, 61 S.E. 166, 169 (W. Va. 1908) (stating that a party is to be excluded 
from testifying “regardless of any interest”). 
203Coleman v. Wallace, 104 S.E.2d 349 (W. Va. 1958). 
204Id. at 351. 
205Lilly v. Ellison, 148 S.E. 380 (W. Va. 1929). 
206Meadows, 468 S.E.2d at 315. 
207Id. at 316. 
208Cale v. Napier, 412 S.E.2d 242, 247 (W. Va. 1991) (quoting Holland v. Joyce, 185 
S.E.2d 505, 511 (W. Va. 1971)). 
209See Holland v. Joyce, 185 S.E.2d 505, 511 (W. Va. 1971). 
210In re Estate of Thacker, 164 S.E.2d 301, 306 (W. Va. 1968) 
211Kimmel v. Shroyer, 28 W. Va. 505, 510 (1886), overruled on other grounds by 
Meadows v. Meadows, 468 S.E.2d 309 (W. Va. 1996). 
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of the Dead Man’s statute is waived if no objection to the competency of the witness 
is made at the trial court; a party cannot wait until appeal to claim testimony should 
have been excluded via the Dead Man’s statute.212  A party is not precluded from 
cross-examining witnesses in West Virginia if there has been a proper objection to 
the direct examination.213  A party is also not precluded from taking the deposition of 
a witness during the discovery phases of the trial, if the witness is otherwise 
prevented from testifying at the trial because of the application of the Dead Man’s 
statute.214
I.  Wisconsin 
Wisconsin’s Dead Man statute is contained in Wisconsin Statute § 885.16 and is 
extended in Wisconsin Statute § 885.17 to transactions one party has had with an 
agent of an adverse party, when the agent is deceased.215  Section 885.16 states: 
No party or person in the party's or person's own behalf or interest, and no 
person from, through or under whom a party derives the party's interest or 
title, shall be examined as a witness in respect to any transaction or 
communication by the party or person personally with a deceased or 
insane person in any civil action or proceeding, in which the opposite 
party derives his or her title or sustains his or her liability to the cause of 
action from, through or under such deceased or insane person, or in any 
action or proceeding in which such insane person is a party prosecuting or 
defending by guardian, unless such opposite party shall first, in his or her 
own behalf, introduce testimony of himself or herself or some other 
person concerning such transaction or communication, and then only in 
respect to such transaction or communication of which testimony is so 
given or in respect to matters to which such testimony relates. And no 
stockholder, officer or trustee of a corporation in its behalf or interest, and 
no stockholder, officer or trustee of a corporation from, through or under 
whom a party derives the party's interest or title, shall be so examined, 
except as aforesaid.216
For over three decades, Wisconsin courts have urged the statute should be repealed 
and have “unabashedly take[n] the position that [the Dead Man’s statute’s] effect 
should be limited wherever possible.”217  The Wisconsin Supreme Court has 
advocated a strict construction of the statute, suggesting “that it is preferable for a 
                                                                
212First Nat’l Bank v. Bell, 215 S.E.2d 642, 645 (W. Va. 1975). 
213Poteet v. Imboden, 88 S.E. 1024, 1028 (W. Va. 1916). 
214Martin v. Smith, 438 S.E.2d 318, 323 (W. Va. 1993). 
215See WIS. STAT. § 885.17 (2003) (stating, in relevant part, that “[n]o party . . . shall be 
examined as a witness in respect to any transaction or communication by the party or person 
personally with an agent or an adverse party of the agent of the person from, through or under 
whom such adverse party derives his or her interest or title, when such agent is dead or 
insane . . .”). 
216WIS. STAT. § 885.16 (2003). 
217In re Estate of Molay v. Molay, 175 N.W.2d 254, 259 (Wis. 1970). 
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jury to weigh the credibility of a witness’s testimony rather than suppress his 
testimony altogether.”218
While the Supreme Court has noted the statute is an “archaic view of the law,”219 
a party moving to exclude a witness’s testimony “must show that: (1) there was a 
transaction or communication between the decedent or witness; (2) the witness has 
an interest in the matter at hand; and (3) the liability or cause of action of the party 
advocating incompetence arose from, through or under the deceased.”220  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court places strong emphasis on objecting not to the evidence 
itself but to the competency of the witness.221  Because the Court is in favor of the 
statute’s repeal, the Court will not consider, on appeal, objections at the trial court 
made to the testimony itself.222
First, the objecting party must establish that an interested survivor will “testify 
about a course of conduct between himself and the deceased which may constitute a 
transaction”223 or that the witness will “testify to conduct between himself and the 
deceased which may provide the basis for an inference that a transaction 
occurred.”224  A transaction means some “personal transaction with the deceased . . . 
in which each [party] is an active participant.”225  The statute, on the other hand, 
“does not prohibit the survivor from describing an event or physical situation, or the 
movements or actions of a deceased person . . . in no way connected with . . . the 
conduct of the party testifying.”226  The statute also does not prohibit testimony by 
third persons, so long as the third-person witness did not participate in the 
transaction and “the participants were not affected by the witness presence.”227  Quite 
possibly a loophole, third persons can also testify as to transactions between an 
interested witness and the decedent.228
                                                                
218Havlicek/Fleisher Enters. v. Bridgeman, 788 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Wis. 1992). 
219Molay, 175 N.W.2d at 259. 
220Schimpf v. Gerald, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (E.D. Wis. 1999). 
221Estate of Robinson, 123 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Wis. 1963). 
222Molay, 175 N.W.2d at 260 (quoting FRANK L. MALLARE, WISCONSIN CIVIL TRIAL 
EVIDENCE, § 1.663, at 24) (1967); see also Giese v. Reist, 281 N.W.2d 86, 91-92 (Wis. 1979); 
In re Estate of Chrisopherson, 650 N.W.2d 52, 60 n.13 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the 
“strictly-imposed requirement about the precise wording of the objection is the result of the 
disfavor with which the courts view this statute, and one way the courts have limited its 
effect”). 
223Johnson v. Mielke, 181 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Wis. 1970). 
224Id. 
225Seligman v. Hammond, 236 N.W. 115, 117 (Wis. 1931). 
226Id. 
227Schimpf v. Gerald, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987-88  (E.D. Wis. 1999). 
228See, e.g., Bridgeman, 788 F. Supp. at 397; Stuart v. Crowley, 217 N.W. 719, 721 (Wis. 
1928); Nelson v. Christensen, 172 N.W. 741, 742 (Wis. 1919); McHatton v. McDonnell’s 
Estate, 165 N.W. 468, 469 (Wis. 1917); In re Laugen’s Will, 99 N.W. 437, 438 (Wis. 1904); 
Brader v. Brader, 85 N.W. 681, 683 (Wis. 1901); Wollman v. Ruehle, 80 N.W. 919, 920 (Wis. 
1899). 
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Second, because “when a witness has no interest in the outcome of the action, he 
has no reason to conceal or lie about facts surrounding the transaction,”229 the 
objecting party must establish the witness is somehow interested in the verdict.230  As 
noted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, it must be shown that the witness is a 
party231 that has some right or interest in the verdict itself, or could somehow receive 
an interest after the verdict is rendered.232  “[T]he true test of the disqualifying 
interest of the witness is whether he [or she] will gain or lose by the direct legal 
operation and effect of the judgment, or that the record will be legal evidence for or 
against him [or her] in some other action.”233  The interest cannot be uncertain or 
contingent; instead, the interest must be “present, certain, and vested.”234  Thus, the 
testimony of a spouse or a child of an interested party is allowed, since those parties’ 
interests are held as remote and contingent.235
Wisconsin courts are strict in applying the Dead Man’s statute; therefore, a party 
must be careful that he or she does not waive the statute’s applicability at the trial 
court.  First, a party will waive the statute’s application if the party cross-examines 
the witness and does not object to the competency of the witness, but the party can 
cross-examine the witness after a proper objection is overruled.236  The party should 
be careful to not extend its cross-examination into areas not previously covered by 
the initial objection, as exceeding the scope of the objection is a grounds for being 
denied protection of the statute.237  Second, the party will waive the statute’s 
application if the trial court objection is not precisely worded.238
IV.  CRITICISM OF DEAD MAN’S STATUTES 
Although they remain valid law in nearly a dozen states, Dead Man’s statutes 
have been criticized by nearly all famous legal scholars over the past 150 years.  
Dean Wigmore, former Dean of the Northwestern University School of Law and a 
master on American evidentiary law, stated: 
As a matter of policy, this survival of the now discarded interest 
qualification is deplorable in every respect; for it is based on a fallacious 
                                                                
229Bridgeman, 788 F. Supp. at 397 (citing Estate of Kemmerer, 114 N.W.2d 803 (Wis. 
1962)). 
230See WIS. STAT. § 885.16 (2003). 
231In re Estate of Christen, 239 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Wis. 1976). 
232Johnson v. Mielke, 181 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Wis. 1970). 
233Id. at 510; see also In re Williams’ Will, 41 N.W.2d 191 (Wis. 1950); In re Estate of 
Novak, 193 N.W. 1000 (Wis. 1923). 
234State v. Fonk’s Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc., 395 N.W.2d 786, 792 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1986). 
235See, e.g., Estate of Christen, 239 N.W.2d at 530; Estate of Nale, 213 N.W.2d 552, 555 
(Wis. 1974). 
236Molay, 175 N.W.2d at 260. 
237Id. 
238In re Estate of Chrisopherson, 650 N.W.2d 52, 60 n.13 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). 
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and exploded principle, it leads to as much or more false decision than it 
prevents, and it encumbers the profession with a profuse mass of barren 
quibbles over the interpretation of mere words.239
Edmund Morgan, another famous scholar and former Reporter for the MODEL CODE 
OF EVIDENCE, noted that Dead Man’s statutes: 
are based upon the delusion that perjury can be prevented by making 
interested persons incompetent or by excluding certain classes of 
testimony.  They persist in spite of experience which demonstrates that 
they defeat the honest litigant and rarely, if ever, prevent the dishonest 
from introducing the desired evidence: if the dishonest party is prevented 
from committing perjury, he is not prevented from some suborning it.  If 
the statutes protect the estates of the dead from false claims, they damage 
the estate of the living to a much greater extent.  And frequently their 
application prevents proof of a valid claim by the representative of [the] 
decedent’s estate.240
Even Professor McCormick, whose very treatise on evidence law is considered a 
staple in the world of hornbooks, notes that: 
Most commentators agree that the expedient of refusing to listen to the 
survivor is . . . a “blind and brainless” technique.  In seeking to avoid 
injustice to one side, the statute-makers ignored the equal possibility of 
creating injustice to the other.  The temptation to the survivor to fabricate 
a claim or defense is obvious enough, so obvious indeed that any jury will 
realize that his story must be cautiously heard.241
Even though each of the nine states surveyed in this article have different forms of a 
Dead Man’s statute, each state statute suffers from the same four criticisms. 
First, as outlined by Dean Wigmore, these statutes assume that some people are 
more dishonest than honest.242  America’s judicial system is based on presuming one 
is innocent until proven guilty, but by their very nature, Dead Man’s statutes prevent 
an entire class of persons from testifying because of an assumption that all witnesses 
are bound to lie when the lips of one are sealed due to death.  For this very reason 
alone, Dead Man’s statutes should be repealed so as to give each party and witness 
the opportunity to present evidence to the trier-of-fact.  Cross-examination provides 
a decedent’s counsel the ability to highlight bias and potential fraudulent claims, and 
in today’s world of television, movies, and multimedia, juries are smarter than ever 
about judicial proceedings and are unlikely to act incompetent when a potential 
fraudulent claim is presented in court.  With the options of deposing and 
interviewing both the “interested” parties and third parties, “[a] searching cross-
examination will usually, in case of fraud, reveal discrepancies inherent in the 
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‘tangled web’ of deception.”243  Our judicial system should afford a trier-of-fact the 
option of weighing that testimony and determining whether a party indeed has a 
valid claim against an estate. 
Second, Dead Man’s statutes present an injustice to the very witnesses who are, 
in fact, honest and have a valid claim against a decedent or intestate who, by one 
reason or another, was unable to make testamentary arrangements for a person.  A 
hypothetical helps to illustrate this injustice.  A farmer has two sons, Dan and Andy.  
As the farmer grows old, Dan and Andy both move their separate ways in life.  Andy 
remains home to assist with the needs of the farm and to care for his ailing father, 
and Dan moves to Los Angeles to pursue a career in acting.  When their father has a 
massive stroke, Andy takes over all the daily tasks on the farm and works a second 
job on the side to pay for his father’s medicinal needs.  Dan, on the other hand, 
ignores pleas from his brother that his help is needed on the farm and that their father 
is dying.  The father, aware of Andy’s unconditional love and support and Dan’s 
mere love of fame and fortune, tells his son Andy that “You are to take total 
possession of my estate.  Please call my lawyer and ask him to come here tomorrow 
to change my will.”  The father, however, dies that night in his sleep.  If Andy were 
to make a claim against the estate, he would be precluded from testifying that his 
father intended to give him all assets and property from his estate.  Even though 
Andy has a valid and honest claim, no trier-of-fact will hear his claim if a Dead 
Man’s statute is valid law.  These laws create an injustice to Andy, as they will 
presume Andy is lying and attempting to take advantage of the estate.  In the end, 
Dan will take half of the estate. 
Third, Dead Man’s statutes are incorrectly worded to accomplish their goal.  
While it is true that the statutes “intended to prevent an undue advantage on the part 
of the living over the dead, who cannot confront the survivor, or give his version of 
the affair, or expose the omission, mistakes or perhaps falsehoods of such 
survivor,”244 these very statutes contain critical exceptions that give dishonest 
persons the ability to use fraud and falsehoods to take advantage of an estate.  Most 
importantly, many Dead Man’s statutes create an exception that allows third parties 
to testify.245  To quote Professor McCormick, “[o]ne who would not balk at perjury 
[on his or her own] will hardly hesitate at suborning a third person, who would not 
be disqualified, to swear to the false story.”246  Therefore, even though Dead Man’s 
statutes intend to prevent harm against an estate, these same statutes invite fraud, 
since an honest party will be unable to dispute the fraudulent third-party claims in 
court.  
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Fourth, scholars, lawyers, judges, and scholars alike are in utter confusion with 
the “labyrinth of decisions, which have often brought confusion rather than 
clarity.”247  Although taken over twenty years ago, one study in the state of 
Washington found that 68% of attorneys and 80% of judges felt the Washington 
Dead Man’s statute was confusing and difficult to administer.248  Nevertheless, since 
the Survey was taken in 1979, Washington courts have continued to broaden, narrow 
and otherwise change the scope of the Dead Man’s statute, which still remains valid 
law.249  Repealing the Dead Man’s statutes would overturn tens of thousands of 
pages of case law in the nine jurisdictions surveyed in this article and create a system 
where triers-of-fact would be given the ability to determine the competency and 
credibility of a witness.  Instead of placing faith in 100 year-old decisions from this 
“archaic view of the law,”250 juries could judge for themselves whether a witness was 
entitled to property or assets. 
V.  PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
In order to achieve justice in this nation, Dead Man’s statues should be abolished 
for other forms of protection against a decedent.  This article presents three separate 
alternatives for states to consider in order to become more in line with those other 
jurisdictions that have abolished or otherwise repealed the Dead Man’s statute.251
First, this article proposes that states follow the lead of Ohio, and presumably 
Alabama, and pass a new Rule of Evidence 601 providing that “Every witness is 
competent except as provided by these rules.”252  Instead of stopping at a new Rule 
601, states should also expressly repeal the Dead Man’s statute in their jurisdiction.  
By repealing the statute and enacting a new Rule 601 to become the governing rule 
of competency of witnesses, states will simplify court procedure and follow the 
initial guidelines of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence.253  Such legislation 
also clears up both trial court and appellate court dockets and saves money from the 
statute’s application.  Although our nation adopted the Dead Man’s statute from 
ancient English law, England never enacted a Dead Man’s statute and “there has 
been no indication that dead men’s estates have been plundered in that country by 
false claimants.”254  As such, besides being free of the “false claimants,” England’s 
trial dockets are also free of the Dead Man’s statute clutter that fills dockets in the 
United States. 
Justice cannot be truly served, however, by the mere passing of a new Rule 601 
and the repeal of the Dead Man’s statute.  If a state is to allow an interested party to 
testify as to a decedent’s statements and transactions, the state should also create a 
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new hearsay exception that affords a decedent’s estate the right to submit evidence to 
the trier-of-fact that responds to, denies, or contradicts the interested party’s 
testimony.  Two states, California and New Hampshire, have enacted such a hearsay 
exception, and these two states present states the chance to mirror their legislation on 
already-existing legislation.  New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) provides: 
In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the representatives of 
deceased persons, including proceedings for the probate of wills, any 
statement of the deceased, whether written or oral, shall not be excluded 
as hearsay provided the Trial Judge shall first find as a fact that the 
statement was made by the decedent, and that it was made in good faith 
and on the decedent’s personal knowledge.255
California’s hearsay exception, found at Evidence Code § 1261, is similar and reads: 
(a) Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule 
when offered in an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of the 
declarant if the statement was made upon the personal knowledge of the 
declarant at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by him 
and while his recollection was clear.  (b) Evidence of a statement is 
inadmissible under this section if the statement was made under 
circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.256
Both of these statutes give the decedent’s estate the option of testifying as to the 
decedent’s actual intentions.  Furthermore, both statutes safeguard the rights of the 
decedent and the interested party by giving the trial judge the opportunity to exclude 
testimony if it appears remote or false, or if it is given in bad faith.257
To further the initial purpose of the Dead Man’s statutes, states should repeal 
their current Dead Man’s statute, enact a more concise Rule 601, and enact a hearsay 
exception that gives decedent’s estates the right to introduce statements of the 
decedent in response to the interested party’s testimony.  As noted by the Maryland 
Court of Appeals, Dead Man’s statutes intended to place two parties, the decedent 
and the interested party, on equal ground.258  New legislation puts these parties on 
equal ground by allowing both parties to testify about the decedent’s intentions, 
transactions or statements. 
Second, if states decide they would like to enact more protection for the 
decedent’s estate than the first proposal for change affords, states should enact 
legislation providing jury instructions in will contests and other similar matters 
noting that “clear and convincing evidence” must be provided to find a decedent 
intended to distribute property to or incurred some debt against an interested party.  
A “clear and convincing evidence” standard would place interested parties at an 
automatic disadvantage, as their testimony and evidence would be presumed false 
without other evidence to support the evidence.  While it is true that the interested 
party could ask third parties and other witnesses to lie on their behalf as supportive 
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evidence, third parties can already testify in proceedings; therefore, this potential 
downfall should not be considered. 
Third, if states decide that Dead Man legislation is too vitally important for the 
protection of the decedent’s estate, states should, at the minimum, follow the lead of 
Arizona and give trial judges the right to apply the statute at their own discretion.259  
Affording power to the trial judge gives states the ability to protect the rights of an 
honest, yet interested party, in limited circumstances as the trial judge sees fit.260  
Such legislation also affords the decedent’s estate the right to appeal a trial judge’s 
inclusion of testimony on an abuse of discretion standard.261  At the very least, this 
option gives some light of hope to interested parties, although either of the previous 
two options are a more ideal solution to this common law nightmare. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although this article has provided a brief historical lesson on Dead Man’s 
statutes and has overviewed the scope and application of nine separate Dead Man’s 
statutes, hundreds of additional pages could be spent further outlining the specific 
application of each particular statute within its jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, by 
providing the reader with a sense of the complicated, confusing and unfair nature of 
this form of common law legislation, the overall purpose of this article has been 
accomplished. 
Thirty-two states have expressly repealed their Dead Man’s statute.262  Of those 
jurisdictions that retain this statute, Dead Man’s statues vary in scope and 
application.  These statutes are confusing and problematic, and as such, for each day 
that these statutes remain valid legislation, our nation will continue to deny justice to 
hundreds of persons.  Therefore, when the state legislatures in the nine jurisdictions 
discussed supra revisit their respective legislation in upcoming years, a change 
should be made that allows all persons the chance to present their evidence and give 
their own testimony in court.  No matter if a state chooses one of the three proposals 
for change outlined in this article or another option better suited for their jurisdiction 
and citizens, states should adopt the current majority view and move toward a 
evidentiary system that is more fair to the majority of persons. 
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